








usiness process reengineering (BPR), a recently popularized phenom-
enon, is offered as a management change strategy when small incre-
mental improvement in the way the business operates is too late or too
little.' Although some companies claim to have conducted BPR well
before 1990, Michael Hammer helped to bring the BPR concept into broader
corporate awareness in his 1990 Harvard Business Review article.^ Within the last
3 years, BPR appears to have permeated the vocabulary of most large manage-
ment consulting organizations and has led organization after organization to
create internal consulting groups with the challenge to reengineer their respec-
tive companies. The book by Hammer and Champy, Reengineering the Corporation.
rose to the New York Times Best-Seller List one month after its publication date
in 1993.^
In late 1990, Pacific Bell, a subsidiary of Pacific Telesis Group and one of
the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies,'* initiated reengineering. By the
late 1980s the competitive environment for regional Bell operating cornpanies
was becoming increasingly complex. The growth in the use of cellular phones, of
private branch exchanges, and cable networks all threatened the "plain old tele-
phone service" that regional Bell operating companies traditionally controlled.
In 1990, Pacific Bell's chief executive officer and president announced a long-
term initiative called Competitive Readiness. The initiative called for 3 "R''s:
restructuring, refocusing, and reengineering:
Funding for this research was generously pnavided by the Harvard Business School Division of
Research and the Ernst and Young Center for Business Innovation,
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL 38, NO, 3 SPRING 1996 57
The Realrty of Business Reengineering
" Restructuring led to breaking the once monolithic company into seven
decentralized regional business units that served customers within speci-
fied geographic regions; statewide business units which focused on public
and corporate customers with points of service throughout the state; and
a product and technology support group composed of product and sys-
tems technology that permeated all facets of the firm's operations.
• Tbe refocusing program led to organizing the firm's priorities and resources
around vision, values, and bold goals. Bold goals were established for a
number of key areas, including maintenance, provisioning or order fulfill-
ment, revenue, job fulfillment, and customer complaints.
• Reengineering was seen as a more targeted and focused program than
restructuring and refocusing. Reengineering was to apply many of the
techniques of Total Quality Management, but result in quantum
improvement.
A manager at Pacific Bell explained the relationship between traditional
quality programs and reengineering: "Business process improvement is seen
here as creating quantum improvement. It is an extreme case of improvement
under the total quality umbrella." This view of the relationship between quality
and reengineering echoes Davenport's assertions about the relationship between
reengineering (or process innovation) and quality.' Davenport goes as far as to
say that "a company that is unsuccessful at one will probably not succeed at the
other."^ This is in sharp contrast to Hammer and Champy who argue tbat quality
and reengineering differ fundamentally given that quality programs seek steady,
incremental improvement whereas reengineering seeks breakthrough improve-
ments by discarding existing processes.
Centrex Provisioning was Pacific Bell's first reengineering project. Cen-
trex. Pacific Bell's flagship offering to business customers, was a central office-
based (as opposed to a customer premises-based) product offering to businesses.
It provided advanced telephone features such as automatic callback, call for-
warding, call holding, call waiting, and conference calling. The reengineering
project was focused on the Centrex order fulfillment process, referred to as provi-
sioning. Since each of Pacific Bell's seven regional business units had its own
sales units and managed its respective central offices, Centrex service was pro-
visioned within each of the seven regional business units. Customer marketing
and operations data suggested that if Centrex was to remain competitive, tbe
cost effectiveness and quality of the order fulfillment process would have to
improve. Senior management believed that an incremental improvement would
have been simply a band-aid approach. A totally new process was needed.
Pacific Bell's senior and middle management have formally recognized
the project as successful. The Centrex reengineering project is also seen as suc-
cessful by a number of outside groups, including AmeriTech, the San Francisco
Chronicle, and Bellcore. A vice president at Pacific Bell summed up the fate of the
project: "Centrex reengineering has been very successful where the projea has
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been implemented." An executive vice president had this view: "The project was
able to deliver its objectives. Centrex was an enormous success."
Each of the regions that implemented a variation of the new Centrex
design realized cost reductions of 36-50%, errors were reduced by 20% or more,
service was delivered when the customer wanted it 99% of the time, and cus-
tomer satisfaction ratings were 90% or higher. While these results were not
earth shattering and were more modest than planned, regional management
viewed the results as radical improvements.
The Centrex project also opened senior management's eyes to the poten-
tial of reengineering. In 1993, Pacific Bell launched a company-wide initiative
called "Core Process Redesign" that was significantly infiuenced by the experi-
ence with the Centrex project. With Core Process Reengineering, management
sought to "fundamentally rethink and redesign business processes to enable
dramatic improvements in customer service, cost structure, and job design." The
team identified 80 change initiatives encompassing every major corporate busi-
ness process: order fulfillment, product development, marketing and selling,
customer service, network creation and operations, procurement, facilities, sys-
tems, finance, human resources, regulatory, and governance. The magnitude of
most of the identified change initiatives was similar to or greater than the
change associated with Centrex Reengineering.
Nevertheless, Pacific Bell's reengineering experience and accomplish-
ments suggest a somewhat different phenomenon than one might expect in
light of the reengineering stories that have been published in the popular press.
The understanding of the concepts and theory of BPR are still at their infancy.
The concepts need to be developed and refined against the backdrop of projects
that have attempted to put the embryonic concepts of reengineering to work.
We selected the Pacific Bell Centrex Reengineering project for in-depth
study and analysis because it met the definition of BPR developed in an earlier
phase of our research project (see Appendix). Thirty-five companies' reengin-
eering efforts were surveyed to develop a definition of BPR (Figure 1).' Those
35 reengineering efforts highlighted the wide variety of methodologies and
approaches employed for reengineering. The commonality among the reengi-
neering projects was the radical nature of the project performance objectives and
the realization that those radical objectives would require organizational change
that was much broader in scale and scope than had been attempted with previ-
ous organization change initiatives.
Not only did the Centrex project meet the empirically derived definition
of reengineering, but Pacific Bell senior management approved and funded Cen-
trex as a reengineering project. An external consulting firm was hired to train
the project members on a reengineering methodology that guided the project
activities. Members of the consulting firm also served as initial members of the
reengineering team.^
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F IGURE I . BPRDefinition
Reengineering is
• a cross-functional initiative
• business process focused




• to enable rodica! performance
improvements
Our objective here is to refine managers' understanding of BPR concepts
by comparing and contrasting Pacific Bell's reengineering experience, a project
perceived to be successful, to the five assumptions of reengineering that are fre-
quently touted by the "early writers" on reengineering.^ In the process, we will
develop a set of reengineering assumptions that more closely reflect the imple-
mentation experiences of Pacific Bell (Table 3). Whereas BPR is different from
the total quality approaches in design, during the implementation stage well done
BPR is similar to total quality approaches. As the early writings of reengineering
suggest, during design, BPR is radical, takes a clean slate approach, is process
driven, top-down directed, and IT enabled. However, during the implementation
stage, BPR is continuously incremental, constrained by the current organiza-
tional realities, subprocess focused, broadly participative, and initially relies on
work role, work flow, and culture changes rather than advanced information
technology. The notion that BPR is not significantly different in charaaer from
quality in implementation is at variance with Hammer and Champy.'°
The first assumption of reengineering is that it involves radical change.
Two characteristics of radical change are outcomes and time frame. Outcomes
refer to the magnitude of the improvement and time frame refers to how long
it should take to accomplish the change. A change that results in incremental
improvement (e.g., a 10% cost reduaion) would not be considered a radical
change and therefore would not be considered to be a satisfactory outcome from
reengineering. Hammer and Champy argue, "Reengineering isn't about making
marginal or incremental improvements but about achieving quantum leaps in
performance." Similarly, Davenport maintains, "Process innovation [i.e., reengi-
neering] is intended to achieve radical business improvement." Radical change
involves dramatic and simultaneous change in business processes, jobs and
struaures, values and beliefs, and management and measurement systems."
The second characteristic of radical change is that it occurs quickly.
Hammer and Champy stated, "Reengineering can't be carried out in small and
cautious steps. It is an all-or-nothing proposition that produces dramatically
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Reengineering results in radical change. Reengineering design may be radical, but implementation is
incremental,
Reengineering assumes clean slate change. Reengineering design assumes clean slate change. However,
implementation W\\\ be limited by those constraints that management
cannot or will not remove.
Reengineering focuses on end-to-end
processes.
Reengineering design focuses on end-to-end process redesign,
Reengineering implementation often focuses on the perceived most
broken pieces.
Reengineering is top-down directed. Reengineering design is top-down directed but imolementation must
be owned from the bottom-up.
Reengineering is information technology
enabled.
Reengineering design is information technology enabled but
implementation might initiate without much ofthe assumed IT
capability.
impressive results."'^ They advise that "twelve months should be long enough
for a company to move from articulation of a case for action to the first field
release of a reengineered process."'^ Other writers of radical organizational
change also describe such changes taking a shon period of time, 6 to 24
months.'''
The new design of the Centrex order fulfillment process indeed strove
for radical changes in the process. The redesign assumed the availability of new
roles, structures, and information technology-based systems that would result
in quantum-leap improvements in cost, quality, time, and customer satisfaction
(Table 4). The accomplishments of the implemented processes were quite a bit
more modest.
At Pacific Bell, "stretch objectives" were
very aggressive or bold goals. Their stretch objec-
tives required a new process that was a major leap
forward from the current state. The future state
would include the capability to provide service
when the customer wanted it, including same-day
service. The service would also be error free. Tradi-
tionally, a Centrex customer's request for service
was fulfilled in 5 to 15 days. The old process was
costly and prone to errors because of the number of
departments that had to be involved and the paper
handoffs that occurred. An order often touched 11



















CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL 38, NO, 3 SPRING 1996 61
The Reality of Business Reengineering
from several functional areas and thus did not funaion as a team. Multiple
handoffs were required, and an error at any point in the process could necessi-
tate significant rework.
The redesign of the order fulfillment process, completed in 60 days, chal-
lenged the traditional work approaches that had emphasized functional special-
ization. The redesign assumed a case manager'^ who would fulfill an order 80%
of the time. That person would interface directly with the customer or account
executive, enter the order, and provide a single point of contact up to the activa-
tion of service. The order would be fulfilled from an inventory of predefined
packages that were already programmed in network software. In light of the
number of individuals and departments that were involved in each order prior
to the Centrex project, the notion that one person could provision a Centrex
order from end to end was revolutionary. When a predefined package did not
exist to fulfill the customer request, a "Virtual Team Scenario" would go into
effea. Under this scenario, a team of functional experts physically residing in
different locations would assemble the order. The employees would work on
the order concurrently, rather than serially as in the past. The team did not
specifically address cultural aspects. Nevertheless, changes in roles and structures
were expected to promote values and norms that were aligned with the stretch
objectives.
The Centrex reengineering team designed the new process and roles,
assuming—for each scenario—the availability of new advanced information
systems. Under the case management scenario, expert systems capabilities would
be required to assist the Centrex service representative in executing end-to-end
service. To facilitate communication and information fiow among virtual team
members for the remaining 20% of orders, the team envisioned a new informa-
tion system that would allow the members of a virtual team to simultaneously
access and manipulate information.
A 60-day trial was planned for the first quarter of 1992 to demonstrate
that the new design concepts would deliver dramatic performance improve-
ments. The trial proved that the design concepts worked. The average service
time was 2.3 days, compared with the traditional service time of five days. If
necessary, the team was able to deliver same-day service. There was the percep-
tion that fewer errors were made and that customer satisfaction was significantly
improved. However, the lack of comparable prior error rates and Centrex-only
customer satisfaction measures made it difficult to quantify the exact improve-
ments in these latter areas. Also the lack of fully operational information tech-
nology applications meant that some tasks had to be carried out manually.
This made it difficult to estimate how well the design would deliver the stretch
objectives. The absence of the desired IT capabilities was counterbalanced by the
competencies and motivation of the trial team: four high performers who had
volunteered for the project and who were highly committed to its success.
By the end of 1993, five of the seven regions had implemented pilots,
but none had accomplished the goals that were initially established. The regions
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• No comparable baseline data was available to quantify exact improvement.
realized cost reductions of 35-50%, a 20-50% reduction in errors, and customer
satisfaaion ratings of 90-97% (Tabie 5). However, none had accomplished the
goals that were initially established. The gaps were due to a number of reasons.
First, only three of the five pilot regions implemented the new roles prescribed
by the design. In two regions, labor union issues made it unfeasible to imple-
ment the new roles in 1993. Secondly, none of the pilot regions felt the need to
implement the pre-defined inventory feature proposed in the initial design and
implemented during the trial. Finally, not all of the information technology-
based capabilities assumed with the new design were available to the regions
at the end of 1993.
Not only did the initial field implementation only partially meet the
objectives, the project also deviated in terms of the original time schedule. When
the Centrex redesign team started, management assumed full implementation of
the new design by 1993. The initial sponsor of the project noted, "I envisioned it
would take us 6-9 months to complete the redesign and establish pilots in all of
the regions." At the end of 1993, five regions had pilots underway and the other
two regions were planning to start pilots in 1994 (Table 6). Several major barri-
ers were not considered by the project team at the outset of the project: labor
issues, the time it would take for the regions to understand and accept the new
design, the time it would take to select and train employees for the new roles,
and the lead time for the new information technology-based applications.
The roll-out plan for each region was delayed because management and
local union leadership had to understand and agree to the proposed positions
before they could be institutionalized, given that 70% of Pacific Bell's employees
were unionized. Also, each region that piloted the new design first conducted its
own analysis of the current state of its order fulfillment process. This analysis
took from 2 to 4 months. Each region then went through an abbreviated design
process where it chose those components of the corporate Centrex design which
addressed its needs. Because of the lead time for corporate IT applications, some
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TABLE 6
Date Event/De5cription
4/9 I Kickoff of Design Team
A de5ign team was formed and chartered to deliver a new design within 60 days
6/91 Initial Design Connpleted
8/91 Subteams formed for trial development
Four sub-teams were formed to plan various aspects ofthe trial. The teams focused on the
following aspects ofthe design: job description, predefined packages, modeling and metrics,
information technology
10/91 Start of technology development for trial
M /91 Employees selected for the trial
Four high-perfonning employees were selected from a pool of volunteers,
1/92 Trial started
The 60-day trial was started in Region A.
5/92 Trial disassembled
Summer 92 Analysis of trial data, presentation of results to regions
7/92 Region D started pilot
11/92 Region E started pilot
IQtr/93 Regions C and G started pilots
2Qtr/93 Region F started pilot
1994 Regions A and B planned pilots
regions designed their own.'^ Consequently, the Centrex reengineering project
did not meet the initial performance targets. Also, thirty to thirty-six months
turned out be a more reasonable time frame for the roll-out than the 18 months
planned initially.
Pacific Bell's experience provides insight regarding the radical change
assumption of reengineering. The Centrex design team sought to accomplish
radical change outcomes, and the stretch objectives established at the outset of
the design process encouraged the design team to fundamentally change the
way that the order fulfillment process was carried out. However, such dramatic
changes could not be implemented in a short time frame. The broader cultural
and political climate, and the lead time necessary for training and information
technology-based applications, required a field-driven, evolutionary implemen-
tation approach. One cause of the modified timetable and performance out-
comes was the difficulty the regions encountered when they attempted to
implement the "clean slate" design.
Reengineering Assumes a Clean Slate Change
A clean slate design, is prevalent in the early writings on reengineering.
Even in his original reengineering article, Michael Hammer proclaimed "Don't
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automate, obliterate," thereby suggesting that reengineering design groups
should throw away all existing processes, activities, systems, and people.'^ [n
so doing, the redesign group could then define processes based on the way that
work should be done unconstrained by current organizational customs and val-
ues. Hammer and Champy noted, "Reengineering ignores what is and concen-
trates on what should be."^^ They elaboraled:
When someone asks us for a quick definition of business process reengineering,
we say that it means 'starting over.' It doesn't mean tinkering with what already
exists or making incremental changes that leave basic structures intact. It isn't
about making patchwork fixes -jury-rigging existing systems so that they work
better. It does mean abandoning long-established procedures and looking afresh
at the work required to create a company's product or service and deliver value
to the customer.'''
Similarly, others advocate that only with "a clean-slate approach to process
redesign . . . can companies avoid the classic reengineering pitfalls."^^
The initial reengineering design for Centrex met the clean slate require-
ment.^' To encourage "out of box thinking," several members of the cross func-
tional 13-member design team had no direct knowledge of Centrex provisioning
and challenged the status quo. The leadership of the design team was dedicated
to the project full time to free themselves from the constraints and concerns of
day-to-day operations. The team also conducted visits with and external bench-
mark studies of companies that exemplified highly innovative approaches to
order fulfillment and were in industries unrelated to telecommunications. As
a senior manager noted:
"During the design, the team went well beyond thinking of the hest way to fulfill
a Centrex order. They sought out the best in class for order fulfillment, in general.
The team visited an insurance company that Is a recognized leader in the pro-
cessing of commercial claims. The team members analyzed that firm's process to
understand how we could radically change the Centrex provisioning process."
Early in trial it became necessary to revise the design to take into account the
existing organization structure, information technology-based capabilities, as
well as the concerns of the local site management and unions over the new roles
prescribed by the design. Also, because of lack of IT support, the scope of the
trial was scaled back to include only simple Centrex orders. The unavailability
of sophisticated communications technology required the members of the "vir-
tual team" to be co-located in the same physical space. The co-location allowed
the team to tightly coordinate activities and perform a series of activities in par-
allel rather than in sequence. Another barrier for virtual collocation was the
difficulty of the concept. The sponsor of the projea noted, "Individuals had
real difficulty grasping the notion of parallel execution of interrelated order
activities by team members who could not see each other."
During the pilots, labor union issues were challenging in two of the
regions. In those regions, management anticipated that significant union
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negotiations would be required to redefine roles and jobs responsibilities,
thereby delaying the realizations of benefits. The managers of those regions
decided to work within the confines of the current state. Rather than redefine
roles, they collocated those employees who were involved in Centrex provision-
ing. The collocation led to improvements in time to complete the order, in error
rates, and in customer satisfaction. Some additional unplanned costs were
incurred because of office space and layout requirements.
The clean slate design was also constrained by the existing legacy systems
(old, typically mainframe-based systems) and the lead time to develop the new
advanced information technology applications that would interface with the
legacy systems. In 1992, a new group was formed to buiid the highly complex
front-end systems and networks and to interface them with the legacy systems.
Nevertheless, the development work was still underway at the end of 1993 on
the order inquiry, inventory, and scheduling applications.
Pacific Bell's experience highlights the faa that one can design assuming
a clean slate, but one must implement assuming an existing state. During the
design phase, a clean slate can foster "out of box thinking." However, the exist-
ing organizations had structures, job definitions, and legacy systems that neces-
sitated compromises during implementation. The inability to achieve the stretch
objeaives in the time frame envisioned and without the constraints of the
past led to an implementation that also violated tbe third assumption of
reengineering.
Reengineering Focuses on End-To-End Process Redesign
The third assumption is that reengineering focuses on end-to-end process
redesign where a process is defined as "a set of aaivities that, taken together,
produce a result of value to a customer."^^ A process focus emphasizes how work
is done within the firm rather than the traditional product focus on what.^'
Common end-to-end business processes in organizations include service deliv-
ery, product development, order fulfillment, and new market development.
Reengineering typically concentrates on so called core processes that increase
the organization's competitiveness.^*
Process reengineering by definition implies that processes are repeatable
and have enough elements of consistency (e.g., clearly identified inputs and
outputs) to justify developing a common process for an organization.^^ Custom-
ers, either within the firm or outside, are usually central to any redesign aaivity.
A reengineering activity typically starts by understanding the existing process
from the customer's perspeaive as well as by identifying customers' needs.
The redesign of Centrex provisioning was an end-to-end process, the
order fulfillment process. The process started with the customer's order and was
completed when the requested service was activated. Customer input was
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solicited to develop and validate the design. Further, the new design was highly
integrated—assuming new tasks, organizational roles, and information systems.
During the trial, some aspects of the future state could not be
implemented so the integrated design was compromised. For example, the pro-
visioning team had to be collocated because IT support of the planned virtual
team was not available. Also, management in several areas were unwilling to
redefine job responsibilities as assumed in the design, therefore roles had to be
redefined.
During the regional pilots, rather than implementing a new end-to-end
process, the regions sought the "low hanging fruit." Since each region provi-
sioned Centrex and since there was not a standard process across the regions,
each had a different current state. Upon committing to pilot the new design,
each region established its own goals for the new process. For example, two
regions set out to reduce cost by 50%, whereas one region aimed at a 40%
reduction. Each region also carried out an analysis of the current state. The
various regions then implemented the parts of the new process that corres-
ponded to the immediate problems and opportunities faced by that locale. Yet,
by attacking the "low hanging fruit," the regions significantly improved the
Centrex provisioning process (e.g. 36-30% cost reduaions)..
The customization of the design by the regions can perhaps best be
explained by differing motivations for change. For example, the region where
the trial was carried out found it was very advantageous to predefine packages
(i.e., pre-program the central office switch with those features most frequently
ordered) because of the workload balancing fiexibility that resulted. That region
also concluded that if it maintained an inventory of pre-defined packages, it did
not need to collocate people. When a "non-standard" order was received, the
lines of communication had been established for physically separated functions
and or departments to coordinate with one another. The trial region was also
different than the other regions in that it included several metropolitan areas,
which had a large concentration of potential Centrex customers.
As described earlier, the relationship that the union and management had
in a particular region was a strong factor in determining whether the new roles
were implemented during the pilot phase. For example, the two regions that did
not change roles for the pilot planned to adopt the new roles once the national
union and corporate staff management sorted out appropriate compensation and
responsibilities for those new roles. In other regions, close union-management
relationships allowed the regions to "trial" the new roles during the pilot in
advance of the renegotiated union contract.
Each of the 5 pilot regions modified the design in light of some unique
characteristic of the region or some management constraint. The modified
designs also helped regions to manage the level of risk associated with the pro-
ject and to make the changes more palatable to their respective constituents.
Perhaps there would have been less variability among what was implemented
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in the various regions if corporate management had mandated that the regions
adopt the redesign as implied by the fourth reengineering assumption.
Reengineering Must Be Top-Down Directed
The fourth assumption of reengineering is that it must be top-down
direaed. Hammer and Champy advocate reengineering as a form of work
design that must be top-down.^'' Because the processes being addressed usually
span across different functional areas, only the highest levels of management are
argued to have the broad perspective to identify the core processes and to pos-
sess the political power to force collaboration and mandate the breadth of
changes. According to Davenport, "Because large firms' structures do not
reflect their cross-functional processes, only those in positions overlooking
multiple functions may be able to see opportunities for innovation."^' Conse-
quently, a high-level design—including the overall flow of the process and its
sub-processes, performance objectives, and inputs/outputs—must be done by a
cross-functional design team whose responsibility is to study the process in its
entirety and consider relevant enablers and benchmarks in its design. The cham-
pions and sponsors of this team have to "own," or be responsible, for all the
pieces and interiaces of the process.
Hammer and Champy stress that reengineering cannot happen from the
bottom-up for two reasons. First, employees and middle managers do not have
the broad perspective required by reengineering. Second, middle managers do
not have the authority to enable the cross-functional process transformation
that is associated with reengineering.^* Others who bave studied radical organ-
izational design, maintain that for fundamental changes to occur in an organ-
ization, personal involvement from the executive leadership is required in
developing the case for action, in design, and in the development of implemen-
tation plans.^* Executive management must also have a hands-on role in the
implementation itself, "motivating constructive behavior, shaping political
dynamics, managing control during the transition period, and managing exter-
nal constituents."^" It has been reported that, in the most successful reengineer-
ing projects, top executives spent between 20% and 60% of their own time on
the project." More importantly, the time commitment of the senior executives
was considerably higher in implementation than in design.
In the Centrex projea, top-down goals and objectives were formulated
at the top of the organization. Senior executives were also visibly involved in
the initial phases of the project. The project was initiated by a corporate execu-
tive vice president who forged a partnership with a regional general manager.
The project was supported and approved by the Pacific Bell senior management
team. Their approval signaled the wide recognition that the firm's flagship prod-
uct was increasingly being replaced by less expensive substitute products, which
also hindered sales of other products and services. The sale of Centrex opened
up sales opportunities for many other products.
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Whereas top-down goals and objectives created the motivation for reengi-
neering, bottom-up acceptance of the design drove implementation success. The
visible involvement of the senior executives decreased as the projea progressed.
Marketing of the new process to the regions was accomplished by the project
team composed of middle managers and staff.
The initial sponsor of the project commented, "When the regional units
started to take ownership and responsibility for the success of the project, my
role diminished to one of ensuring adequate financial resources." At Pacific Bell,
no corporate mandate was issued to implement the design and do so by a certain
date. The team leader of Centrex reengineering explained:
'We [corporate} have provided the vision for the new process and have proven
the concepts and the benefits. Process implementation must be a decision of a
particular business. The regions that have piloted the new process have shown the
benefits on the production scale. The pilots have created a tremendous grass-roots
interest in getting Centrex reengineering implemented. People now come to us
who want to do. We [the Centrex projea team] no longer have to sell this to the
regions."
The actual implementation of Centrex reengineering was a business unit, not a
corporate, initiative. Each pilot implementation required that the business unit
general manager establish Centrex reengineering as a priority. This meant
appointing a project manager who became the champion of the new process.
This also meant that the general manager personally stayed involved in order to
remove organizational barriers that might hinder the reengineered process. The
degree to which the general manager was personally involved translated into
what was achieved. The one region with the most accomplishments had the
most visibly involved general manager.
Yet, none of the regional general managers mandated Centrex reengi-
neering. In the most extreme case, one regional business unit general manager
made a public commitment to implement the new roles and the new process
across all Centrex orders. In other regions, a much more gradual roll-out
occurred. This has generated some frustration. One manager in a region com- "
plained, "We know the new process works. Management and labor should
mandate this process."
The void of a corporate or regional mandate resulted in each region
developing its own "case for action" before proceeding with implementation.
Some regions were motivated by the opportunity to fix a perceived broken
process. These regions had already documented or unveiled customer or field
employee problems with Centrex provisioning. Others saw the opportunity to
improve the competitive positioning of their organization. The rest opted to
change those pieces of the new process that would face the least resistance.
The former two groups were likely to embrace aggressive objectives as well
as a larger part of the new process. The last group had less ambitious, more
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incremental process improvement goals and tended to implement only a piece
or two of the new process. A manager remarked;
"Everyone agrees that the concepts of the design are the right ones. Disagreement
seems to exist across the regions on to what extent and how to implement the
design. Further, some regions will be happy if they can realize a 10% reduction
in cost or error rates."
Reengineering Is Information Technology Enabled
Our discussion of the first four assumptions shows that information tech-
nology is one reason that the realized outcomes did not meet the initial assump-
tions of reengineering. The fifth assumption of reengineering is that information
technology (IT) plays a prominent role in the design process itself, as well as in
the final redesigned business process. This is different from the conventional
wisdom that assumes a process should be designed before investigating enabling
technology or systems. For example, the author of Process innovation noted, "To
suggest that process designs be developed independently of IT or other enablers
is to ignore valuable tools for shaping processes."*^ Another recommends that
"current and emerging IT and IS capabilities...should be used as a lever for
designing new organizations and associated business processes."" Hammer and
Champy similarly describe the requirement to include IT during the design of a
new process as the challenge to think inductively. They noted, "Reengineering,
unlike automation, is about innovation. It is about exploiting the latest capabil-
ities of technology to achieve entirely new goals. One of the hardest parts of
reengineering lies in recognizing the new, unfamiliar capabilities of technology
instead of its familiar ones."̂ "* They believe that technology can play a role in
helping members to think of new ways of working that had not been envisioned
before.
Besides helping to create new alternatives to accomplishing work, IT Is
seen as an integral part of the final implemented process." Among the capabili-
ties that IT offers are instantaneous worldwide reach, shared database access,
ability to capture and repeat the decision processes of experts, a prodigious
memory, and the ability to personalize almost any transaction based on the
needs of the user, organization, or customer.
During the design phase of Centrex, knowledge of advanced IT capabili-
ties enabled the development of a radical design; however, implementation pro-
ceeded without much of the advanced IT capability. During the design phase of
Centrex reengineering, the capabilities of advanced IT-based systems, such as
groupware and single system image, were assumed to be available. These sys-
tems were deemed necessary to provide seamless access to legacy systems and to
enable real-time information sharing across virtual team members. The assumed
capabilities of advanced IT-based systems influenced the design.
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Prototype applications were developed for use during the trial. They
changed the way that the employees interacted with technology. A manager
noted, "Before the trial, the employees saw the systems as performing the busi-
ness process; their job was to make the systems work. After the trial, they saw
the team performing the business process and the systems serving as an infor-
mation tool." The technology was enabling rather than mechanizing the busi-
ness process.
Yet the trial and pilots highlighted that the role of IT is secondary to
the establishment of collocated teams. A regional business unit manager noted,
"During the trial, there was a lot of energy around teams." Another regional
business unit manager estimated that 80% of the productivity improvement
realized in his region resulted from the formation and the use of collocated
teams. The rest of the productivity improvement was due to the new technology
support.
Since the lead-time to develop the advanced-IT applications and to inter-
face them to the 10-12 legacy systems were long and/or costly, human systems
and structures were developed for the trial that were not dependent on the most
advanced IT capabilities assumed by the original design. For example, trial mem-
bers were given access to additional systems from their workstation, but the data
from those systems was not integrated. Completing the trial before developing
full-blown systems permitted the validation of the design before a significant
IT development effort was undertaken. Further, Pacific Bell was able to gather
systems requirements in light of experiences with the new work roles and
procedures.
The Centrex reengineering initiative suggests that the capabilities of
advanced-IT can help envision radical process designs and enable small trials
of the process.*^ Yet managers must be careful that systems do not inhibit the
implementation of new processes. Whereas Pacific Bell was able to deploy
Centrex and reap significant benefits with little advanced IT support, we have
observed many cases where the unavailability of some IT-based capability
became the excuse for not implementing the new proven process. However,
someone at Pacific Bell (for example, a process owner at the corporate level)
must be a keeper of the original vision and continue to push for technology
that enables the full vision.
Summary and Conclusion
Reengineering can be a powerful change phenomenon. However,
managers who consider undertaking reengineering need to understand how it
unfolds in practice. Just as we have found with other management innovations
such as total quality management," putting the innovation to work rarely
matches the initial concepts and models of the innovation. The Pacific Bell
Centrex Reengineering initiative, an acknowledged reengineering success story.
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highlights some of the limitations of the broadly professed assumptions
of reengineering. Our analysis suggests the following revised assumptions:
• Reengineering design may be radical, but implementation is incremental.
• Reengineering design assumes clean slate change. However, implemen-
tation will be limited by those constraints that management cannot or
will not remove.
• Reengineering design focuses on end-to-end process redesign. Reengi-
neering implementation often focuses on the perceived most-broken
pieces.
• Reengineering design is top-down directed, but implementation requires
acceptance from the bottom-up.
• Reengineering design is enabled by information technology, but the
implementation might be initiated without much of the assumed IT
capability.
Tbe first assumption declared that reengineering results in a radical
change. Our analysis of Pacific Bell's experience with Centrex suggested that
the reengineering initiative resulted in a radical new design for Centrex provi-
sioning. However, what was implemented in the regions differed from the design
and was not as radical as planned. BPR efforts need a balance between stretch
and realistic time frames and objectives in order to manage expectations for the
continued support of the projea.
The second assumption specified that reengineering assumes clean slate
change. The redesign of the Centrex provisioning process was carried out assum-
ing a clean slate. However, the trial and regional pilots, had to be implemented
in "non clean slate" settings and were therefore limited by the internal and
external organizational constraints and roadblocks that regional and corporate
management did not remove. Again, expectations have to be managed through-
out the organization regarding the areas that can be challenged and changed as
well as the lead time required for making changes in these areas.
The third assumption highlighted the end-to-end process focus that
is typically associated with reengineering. At Pacific Bell, the design that was
developed by the corporate reengineering group was very integrated and
assumed the various aspects of the end-to-end provisioning process. During the
regional pilots, however, managers implemented those aspects of the design that
would bring them the most benefit for the least effort. Hence, for local imple-
mentation, a close linkage has to exist between the imminent problems faced
and the solutions proposed in BPR.
The fourth assumption suggests that reengineering must be top-down
directed. At Pacific Bell, some regional management did encourage Centrex
reengineering. However, implementation was enabled where front-line employ-
ees embraced the initiative. In BFR efforts, ownership and commitment is
needed throughout the organization, particularly during implementation.
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The final assumptions stated that reengineering is enabled by IT. At
Pacific Bell, a large portion of the benefits of reengineering accrued because of
the structural and role changes that were made. The new work processes were
implemented first; information technology capabilities were rolled out gradually.
Implications ofthe Revised Assumptions
As the first two assumptions state, radical implementation is difficult to
accomplish in an existing organizational context. Management of expectations
is key. Although stretch objectives and aggressive time frames are needed to get
the change program underway, the organization and management must be
ready to accept a slower pace and more moderate success in implementation.
However, if a radical implementation is required, managers must seek ways to
create new organizations. The establishment of a greenfield site or a move to
a new location might provide the opportunity for such a new organizational
context.
In keeping with the spirit of the first implication, the Pacific Bell case
suggests that it may be unrealistic to assume that one can implement an end-
to-end redesign in an existing organization. Where it is not possible to establish
a new organization, it is important to go after the low hanging fruit and change
incrementally month after month or year after year, while keeping an eye on
the ultimate goal of end-to-end process innovation.
The third implication of our findings at Pacific Bell is the importance of
bottom-up buy in of a design. The fact that the Pacific Bell regions engaged in a
redesign activity fostered ownership of the design. It may be important to allow
those affected by changes to customize pieces of a design in a reengineering
project.
Another implication is that managers must plan for the lead time associ-
ated with IT application development. Further, one should not allow the project
to become side-tracked because of the unavailability of the IT applications
assumed in the design. It may be possible to make significant strides toward the
accomplishment of the goals of redesign without the assumed IT applications.
In conclusion, we acknowledge that the restated reengineering assump-
tions are by no means the last word on reengineering. The Centrex case and our
other research sites reflect an early stage of reengineering. Reengineering is still
in its infancy as organizations are just beginning to institutionalize processes that
have resulted from their early reengineering initiatives. Reengineering zealots
might argue that Pacific Bell had a fiawed process; top management should have
required that all of the regions adopt the Centrex design without deviation.
However, given the cultural and political climate at Pacific Bell, which encour-
aged entrepreneurship within the regions, senior management could not man-
date the implementation of the Centrex design.
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APPENDIX
Study Methodology
The current case study, the Centrex reengineering project, is a product of
an ongoing research study on managing change in business process reengineer-
ing. The multi-year research study has multiple phases. The first phase involved
a retrospeaive analysis of three reengineering projeas in three companies.
Change management tactics used in the projeas were identified and categorized
to help build a theoretical "lens" for the research.**
The second phase involved a field survey with 35 companies on their
reengineering projects. The companies studied were selected because they
claimed to bave one or more reengineering projects that were underway or had
recently been completed. A definition of a reengineering projea was one of the
main outcomes of this phase. A reengineering project was defined in terms of
the initial objectives of the project. It is an effort that the management in the
company launches as a radical organizational initiative. A project aims to accom-
plish change with the following charaaeristics:
• a cross-funaional scope (more than two functional areas)
• a business process focus (versus, for example, a technology, information,
or organizational structure focus)
• a simultaneous change in: organization design (e.g., teams, delayering,
consolidation of functions); culture; and information technology
• radical performance improvements (over 50% improvement in cost,
quality, cycle-time, customer satisfaction, and/or market share}.
Change that shares the above characteristics goes counter to conventional
ways an organization has accomplished work. The definition was used to screen
and select reengineering projects for in depth case studies of which Pacific Bell
Centrex Reengineering is one example.
The Pacific Bell projea is the first completed case study out of the longitu-
dinal study phase. The phase involves longitudinal studies of 12 business reengi-
neering projects in 8 organizations, five of which are service organizations and
three of which are manufacturing organizations. Participants in the longitudinal
case studies receive site visits every three to five months in addition to 30-60
minute phone conferences with the project manager or project leader on a regu-
lar basis. Site visit interviews involve organizational members such as the senior
management of the firm, executive project sponsor, senior operating manage-
ment of the projea, reengineering projea participants, and customer represen-
tatives of the process.
The Centrex reengineering project at Pacific Bell is an exemplar of a
reengineering projea in our longitudinal case study phase, both in terms of
research process as well as the main project findings. Over 25 people at Pacific
Bell were interviewed. Interviews were conducted with representatives of the
senior leadership and all functional management affeaed or involved with tbe
Centrex reengineering. Interviews were also conduaed with representatives
of all the geographical regions. (As of January 1994, the seven regions were
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collapsed to four regions). The interviews were semi-structured, with each
interview lasting from forty-five minutes to one and a half hours. The two
researchers attended all interviews, helping to increase the reliability and
confidence of the perceptions and observations.
The findings of the Pacific Bell Centrex project as discussed in this article
are being reinforced in the other 11 longitudinal case studies that are still in
progress. Hence, this article reports the Pacific Bell project in the light of the
observations from the other studies. Because of the representative nature of
the project, the Pacific Bell Centrex reengineering initiative allows us to begin
to refine the concepts and theory of reengineering.
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